The common pattern across all of these seems to be filesystem and network ACLs enforced by the OS, not a separate kernel or hardware boundary. A determined attacker who already has code execution on your machine could potentially bypass Seatbelt or Landlock restrictions through privilege escalation. But that is not the threat model. The threat is an AI agent that is mostly helpful but occasionally careless or confused, and you want guardrails that catch the common failure modes - reading credentials it should not see, making network calls it should not make, writing to paths outside the project.
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This is a well-known browser security technique. In JavaScript, calling .toString() on a native browser function returns "function appendBuffer() { [native code] }". Calling it on a JavaScript function returns the actual source code. So if your appendBuffer has been monkey-patched, .toString() will betray you; it’ll return the attacker’s JavaScript source instead of the expected native code string.
Филолог заявил о массовой отмене обращения на «вы» с большой буквы09:36